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SMALL  IS  BEAU TIFU L :  S C AL ING  DOW N TH E  LON G CE N TE R FOR THE  PE RFORMIN G A RTS  IN  AUST IN
This case was prepared for a class discussion rather than to demonstrate 
either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation, and is 
based on seven interviews with staff, board members, and community lead-
ers involved with the Long Center for the Performing Arts project as well as 
internal documents and the public record. The authors would like to thank 
all of the people who graciously agreed to be interviewed.
Credit: Long Center at night, Photo credit: Alfie Photography / Shutterstock.com
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 n the early 1990s, a small group of civic leaders and 
arts patrons in Austin, Texas, began discussing the 
construction of a major new performing arts center. A 
city that prides itself on its counter-culture ways, liberal 
politics, and educated population, Austin is filled with 
bumper stickers calling on the locals to “Keep Austin 
Weird.” With the University of Texas, the state capitol, 
the second largest high-tech concentration after Silicon 
Valley, a relaxed social culture, and a reputation for being 
a live music mecca, civic pride runs deep in Austin. Yet 
tailoring a performing arts center’s size, budget, scope, 
and programming to local audience tastes, donor prefer-
ences, and local culture was a difficult task. 
I
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FAILURE  TO LAU NC H
 n the summer of 2003, two trustees of the planned-but- 
still-unbuilt Long Center for the Performing Arts came 
to convince their largest donor, Joe Long, to become the 
board’s chairman. The chair was vacant after the resigna-
tion of the Long Center’s second chairman in four years. 
The previous board meeting was a turbulent discussion of 
the dwindling options for how to make a new performing 
arts center in Austin a reality. The Long Center needed 
money—over $140 million to start executing its ambi-
tious plan—but only $60 million had been raised and the 
campaign had stopped generating new pledges. Several 
of the trustees, including the chairman, left the board. The 
existence of an independent performing arts center in 
Austin seemed more in doubt than ever, and the remaining 
trustees thought Joe Long was the one person who could 
save the project. 
The two trustees who came to propose the chairman-
ship to Long were Marvin Womack and Steve Davis. They 
thought that the project could be salvaged if scaled down 
in ambition and budget. This change in scale would require 
a drastic and difficult shift in paradigm. The board, staff, 
and leaders of the three founding companies—Austin 
Symphony, Austin Lyric Opera, and Ballet Austin—would 
have to start the design and planning process almost 
entirely from the beginning and reevaluate many strategic 
choices, from the question of adaptive reuse to the op-
erating model for the future to the number of stages and 
seats. They would have to weigh many strategic priori-
ties, including artistic excellence, community support, and 
financial sustainability of the future center and its found-
ing companies, as well as carefully assess their existing 
capabilities and resources. Promises made during the first 
design process—such as the promise to build a rehearsal 
hall and to deliver world-class acoustics—would have to be 
reconsidered. The Long Center was a decade-old dream 
for many of its constituents, including donors and artistic 
companies who would perform there. All of them would 
have to be convinced to make significant compromises 
in how they saw the future home of the performing arts 
groups in Austin. Davis and Womack thought that Joe 
Long was one of the few people capable of succeeding in 
this difficult job.  
Long is a tall, gray-haired man who speaks with a slight 
Texas accent. He came from a small town, went to the 
University of Texas at Austin on an ROTC scholarship, and 
made a large fortune in banking after serving in the Army, 
working as a teacher, running a dairy farm, and studying 
law. He has a reputation as a shrewd and tough business-
man, a calm, confident man who valued structure and 
data over emotions and instincts in decision making. Even 
in Austin’s informal culture, his peers call him “Mr.” out of 
respect and deference. He had been a Long Center trustee 
for several years, but according to Davis, at the last meet-
ing Long had told him “he was not prepared to waste any 
more time on this.” 
In order to convince Joe Long to assume the chairman-
ship of the Long Center board, Womack and Davis 
arrived with back-of-the-envelope calculations of how 
much could be cut from the construction budget and 
how much more could be raised. Joe Long listened but 
gave them no immediate answer, taking the evening to 
think about the matter further and to consult his wife, 
Teresa Lozano Long. He realized that the decision he 
was making was whether the Long Center project would 
continue at all. “I felt like if it was going to get done, I was 
going to have to do it,” he said. 
I
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HOME OF  THEIR  OW N
he idea for the Long Center was born out of the 
Ballet, Symphony, and Opera’s fear of becoming 
homeless. A hall with the correct seating capac-
ity is important to all performing companies, who de-
pend on earned income from ticket sales to sustain their 
operations. A hall that is too large for a given company’s 
audience leads to a loss of intimacy and has a pronounced 
psychological effect on both the performers on stage and 
the audience members sitting in a half-empty theater. A 
hall that is too small necessitates longer runs of each pro-
duction in order to collect sufficient revenues. These lon-
ger runs may not be possible due to scheduling conflicts 
at the venue. In Austin, the only venue of sufficient size for 
the Opera, Ballet, and Symphony was the Bass Concert 
Hall on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin. 
When Bass Concert Hall first opened, the University 
courted the Symphony and the Ballet to become resident 
companies there, and thereby increase Bass Hall’s cultural 
cachet. When Austin Lyric Opera was founded, Bass Hall 
became its home, too. Now, however, the companies 
found themselves being crowded out of the schedule by 
university performances and touring, national, lucra-
tive acts like Broadway shows. The dates the companies 
could now secure frequently fell on the days of the foot-
ball games at the stadium about 200 yards away, when 
parking was scarce and rivers of orange-clad Longhorn 
fans streamed down the streets to either the game itself 
or to one of the hundreds of tailgating parties in the 
surrounding area, where beer and brisket ruled the day. 
The patrons of the Opera, Ballet, and Symphony found 
getting to Bass Hall under those conditions difficult. 
Moreover, with Bass Hall in increasingly high demand, 
rental fees suddenly doubled, and University officials 
began suggesting that Bass Hall could not continue be-
ing the home for these independent classical companies 
much longer. In the short-term, the companies faced the 
prospect of being homeless for two seasons as Bass Hall 
planned to close for mandatory fire safety renovations 
and lobby expansion. The companies dreamed of a home 
of their own, where they could have first priority in re-
serving dates and where they, rather than the University 
or the city, could be in charge of their destinies. 
Three trustees of these companies known as the Three 
Js—Jo Anne Christian, Jare Smith, and Jane Sibley—saw a 
new performing arts center not affiliated with a university 
as crucial to the groups’ survival in Austin. At some point, 
all three served as chairwomen or presidents of the boards 
of their artistic companies. Jo Anne Christian, whose 
husband had been the White House press secretary dur-
ing Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency, is a lawyer with a 
memory her friends describe as a steel trap. Jare Smith 
is the youngest of the three as well as a trustee of Ballet 
Austin and the co-chair of the capital campaign begin-
ning with the summer of 2003. Jane Sibley is legendary in 
Austin not only for her leadership at the Long Center and 
the Symphony, but also for her historic home with a heart-
shaped pool in central Austin and her custom of wearing a 
feather in her hair. 
To make their dream a reality, the three Js started small, 
by inviting a few business leaders to have lunch with them. 
They continued this lunch campaign until they stirred up 
enough interest to incorporate a nonprofit, which after 
several name changes would become known as the Joe R. 
and Teresa Lozano Long Center for the Performing Arts. 
A board of trustees was recruited. Several professionals, 
including a local architecture firm, TeamHaas, offered their 
services pro bono. 
By 1998, the proposal took concrete shape. The Long 
Center asked the city for the Palmer Auditorium, which 
occupied a large lot overlooking the Lady Bird Lake in 
Central Austin. The Palmer had hosted performing arts 
events before, but was now used mostly for charity events 
and smaller conventions like the city’s summer camp expo. 
The building’s green dome, a familiar Austin landmark 
since 1958, seemed as beloved by some city residents as 
it was hated by others. The Long Center proposed to gut 
and renovate the Palmer as a new performing arts center 
using private funds that were to be raised in a $40 million 
capital campaign. After opening, the Long Center would 
operate the building under a 50-year, $1-a-year lease ar-
rangement, but the city would still be the legal owner. The 
city council was concerned about the size of the Long 
Center’s future operational deficits, and the Long Center 
proposed to raise a $10 million endowment as well. The 
council reasoned that at a 5 percent annual draw rate, a 
$10 million endowment would be sufficient to cover the 
projected operating deficit of $500,000. This city estimate 
was not based on any operational forecasts, but on the 
benchmark of the existing Palmer Auditorium’s annual 
deficit of $500,000. Furthermore, the city asked the Long 
Center to build a smaller venue for use by Austin’s smaller 
performance groups. For its part, the city council agreed 
to spend $46 million of municipal bond money to build a 
new events center nearby, as a replacement for the Palmer, 
and a parking garage that could be shared by both facili-
ties. Cliff Redd, the current executive director at the Long 
Center, described this deal as the city giving the Long 
Center “the most important piece of dirt in the city,” but 
attaching not just strings to their gift, but “ropes enough 
to lift the Titanic.” This proposal was approved by Austin 
voters in a 1998 referendum. 
T
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Initial rounds of fundraising went well. Joe and Teresa 
Long pledged $20 million to the effort in 1999, thus giving 
the project an air of credibility. Over $25 million came from 
“Dellionaires,” including Michael and Susan Dell, as well as 
other present and former Dell employees. In 2000, $40 
million was pledged. 
Meanwhile, a board-appointed owners’ representative 
committee was working with the professional consultants 
on a building program—the list of required features for the 
building—and a design. The consultants included a top-tier 
theater consultant, Fischer Dachs and Associates (FDA), 
acousticians, cost consultants at Donnell Consultants In-
corporated (DCI), and two teams of architects—Skidmore, 
Owings, and Merrill (SOM), a national, award-winning firm; 
and the local TeamHaas. 
The scope of the project expanded as more ideas for 
improving the project were generated. “You get people’s 
vision machines going. Everybody who was in that room 
was in the ‘yes’ mood,” said Cookie Ruiz, the executive di-
rector of Ballet Austin. With fundraising going well, at the 
architect’s request, the board approved an increase of the 
construction budget to about $80 million, though a lack 
of clarity about whether the $80 million was supposed to 
cover hard construction costs alone or the total costs of 
the project persists among project leaders. In addition to a 
large 2,000 seat hall for the Symphony, Opera, and Ballet 
and the 250-seat black box theater for the smaller groups, 
the Long Center trustees now planned to build a third the-
ater of 750 seats. The main hall would have a crystal chan-
delier and world-class acoustics. A rehearsal hall would be 
included in the facility. The architectural concept by SOM 
also retained the Palmer’s distinctive architectural features, 
like its dome, at significant cost. “They [SOM] did what we 
asked them to do,” said Joe Long. “They designed a world-
class facility. I think like a lot of architects they were just 
accustomed to designing, and cost wasn’t a factor.” 
Cliff Redd was less charitable. Redd was a lifelong Texan 
and fast-talking arts impresario fond of colorful language. 
He said that the first design suffered from “overdesign-
ing” and “overreaching.” He said: “You’re dealing with the 
Symphony, Opera, and Ballet who are coming out of the 
situation where they feel like they have been maligned, 
where they didn’t have the tools they needed to do what 
they needed to do, and so they want everything.” 
This design was approved by the board in 2001, and SOM 
was paid $8 million for their work. The other consultants 
were paid another $4 million. A total of 1,100 pages of 
blueprints were printed and sent out for contractor bids, 
the lowest of which came back with the construction price 
tag of $115 million in 2002. An additional $25 million would 
be necessary to cover consultants, financing costs, capital 
campaign costs, and the $10 million endowment prom-
ised to the city. Donors not involved with the board were 
“furious.” To the trustees themselves, the new price tag felt 
like a “train hitting the wall,” and the project was beginning 
to look like “a Rubik’s Cube that may not have a solution,” 
said Redd. After paying the architects, the Long Center 
had $12 million remaining in cash and $35 million in out-
standing pledges. The board faced the prospect of raising 
another $90 million in order to cover its ambitious plan. 
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SETBACKS
t this point, external conditions and community 
sentiment toward the project worsened. The 9/11 
attacks and the dot-com crash sent the national 
economy into a recession that heavily affected Austin, 
with its high concentration of high-tech companies and 
jobs. Moreover, the community was becoming increasingly 
skeptical about the project. Austin is the self-titled “Live 
Music Capital of the World” because its blend of hip-
pie and hipster culture had supported a thriving country 
and rock music scene for decades. But the Symphony, 
Opera, and Ballet were perceived by some as art forms 
that belonged to the “establishment.” As Redd pointed 
out, “Austin’s core value is, we have this adversity about 
the Man. Our parents and grandparents were Man-averse. 
That’s why Austin is so quirky. Anything that represents a 
lot of authority, they are just not about it.” David Flem-
ing, the CEO of the Long Center from 2000 to 2003, 
described this sentiment as follows: “Many people in town 
scratched their heads and said, ‘I don’t have any interest in 
symphony, opera, and ballet. Why is this center being built 
for them?’” The plan for the Long Center included smaller 
venues for the more avant-garde groups that were in 
keeping with Austin’s countercultural bent, but the percep-
tion of elitism still proved difficult to combat. Moreover, 
raising $90 million looked like an impossible task, and the 
community began to doubt the Long Center would ever 
be built. 
The trustees and staff pressed ahead. For a while, the 
board counted on construction bonds pitched to them 
by Bank One. The bonds would cost $6 million, but 
would, Bank One sales people suggested, ensure not only 
a timely groundbreaking but also provide an arbitrage 
opportunity. The bonds would bear a low, tax-exempt 
interest rate, costing the Long Center a mere 4.5 percent. 
Surely, the Long Center could get a higher rate of return 
on past and future donations in the stock and bond 
market. The difference between the investment income 
and debt payments would boost the Long Center’s bud-
get. The conditions of the pledges received in the past 
posed an obstacle, however, and before the deal could be 
completed, the stock and credit markets contracted. The 
bond financing proved unworkable. 
At the time, the failure to secure bond financing was seen 
by many trustees as an aggravating setback. Yet with the 
benefit of hindsight, the failure of the bond deal is now re-
garded by some as a tremendous stroke of luck that freed 
the Long Center from making large, annual debt payments 
out of its operational funds. Director of finance Dwayne 
Cooper joined the Long Center after an accounting career 
in the private sector once the bond discussions with Bank 
One were already underway. He thought that the promise 
of bonds had enabled the costs of the first design to go 
unexamined. Joe Long said he had always thought the 
bonds a “harebrained idea.” 
Once it became clear that no loans would be forthcoming, 
the Long Center trustees and staff tried other strategies. 
In the early part of 2003, they tried to reboot the capital 
campaign. They hired consultants to train trustees and 
staff in fundraising and held several special events, one 
to raffle off a donated Porsche. But an aura of failure had 
already attached itself to the project. The new campaign 
was not any more successful than the old. 
In Austin in particular, this aura of failure was a kiss of 
death because the city had seen several high-profile 
constructions stall. The concrete shell of the building that 
Intel had abandoned after beginning construction in 2001 
took up the entire block a short walk from the downtown 
offices of the Long Center. Even two-and-a-half years 
after Intel stopped construction, the naked cement rib 
cage was still an eyesore in the middle of downtown. 
A few blocks northeast was the Austin Museum of Art, 
which by then had tried to build itself a new home twice. 
Both times, the museum failed to execute on its plan, and 
both times, Austin philanthropists, large and small, did 
not receive refunds. These experiences made the Long 
Center’s potential donors and community stakeholders 
jittery. Not only was little additional money forthcoming, 
but some donors refused to make further payments on 
pledges before ground was broken.  
By spring, starting over and formulating a different build-
ing program and developing a different design started to 
look like the only option for ever making the Long Center 
a reality. This was the undertaking that Steve Davis and 
Marvin Womack were now asking Joe Long to lead. 
Long weighed several arguments as he considered the 
matter on the evening of Davis and Womack’s visit. First, 
they had convinced him that his assuming the chairman-
ship was the only way the Long Center would become 
a reality. His primary concern was the risk that sufficient 
funds could not be raised and that debt would need to 
be assumed. “I wasn’t going to be a part of a project that 
borrowed money. That didn’t interest me at all,” Long said. 
Another issue was a personal interest in not seeing any 
more of his philanthropic funds go to waste if the Long 
Center building effort failed. “Let me just say that it would 
have saved me a hell of a lot of money if we hadn’t gone 
forward,” Long said. “It would have saved me $7 or 8 mil-
lion.” The Longs’ $20 million pledge was conditional on 
progress toward the Long Center completion, and if the 
project stalled now, only the $12 million they had already 
given in cash would be lost. A net of $15 million had been 
spent by the Long Center so far on operational costs and 
fees of architects and other consultants.
A
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The strongest argument for taking the chairmanship and 
making sure that the project continued was the likeli-
hood that if the Long Center failed, then all cultural capital 
projects would fail in Austin for the foreseeable future, just 
as several had already in the recent past. The community 
faith in the cultural sector’s competency needed to be 
restored. Long was also concerned about seeing other 
donors’ money go to waste. “I wasn’t concerned so much 
about the large contributors, I was concerned about the 
small ones. Of course, we spent a lot of the money, so it 
wasn’t there to refund. I knew that was going to leave a 
real dirty taste in a lot of people’s mouths.” Last but not 
least, he was confident in his own abilities. “I wasn’t accus-
tomed to failing at anything,” he said. “I wasn’t about  
to fail at this.” 
The next day, Joe Long announced he’d accept the chair-
manship, with one condition: Steve Davis was to head the 
owners’ representative committee in addition to staying 
on as treasurer. Davis had just retired from an engineer-
ing career and was looking forward to free time, but he 
agreed. “I thought he’d be able to prevent what happened 
the first time,” said Long. He thought that Davis and the 
other members of the committee “could watch the archi-
tect and the engineers and ride herd over them and keep 
them within the budget because that had to be done.”
The owners’ representative committee was expanded from 
being made up of three board volunteers and two staff 
members to a committee of 12—six trustees, three staff 
members, and the three directors of the Big Three classical 
art groups. Jo Anne Christian, one of the project’s original 
Three Js, became a member. (Her fellow Js—Jane Sibley 
and Jare Smith—continued serving on the board.) 
From August through December of 2003, the committee 
met weekly to work on the new program and design. Many 
of the negotiations over the new hall’s features could not 
be resolved in the meetings, and discussions continued 
during phone calls and electronically, through email and 
instant messages. Cookie Ruiz of Ballet Austin remembers 
one exhausting, four-hour-long conference call between 
the consultants and the executive directors. The goal was 
to cut half a million so that another half a million feature 
could be added. Many decisions were just as grueling. 
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TIME  FOR A  RE DES IG N:  P R OG R AM  ZER O
he redesign process started with Davis and two 
other trustees, as well as key Long Center staff like 
David Fleming, the CEO who resigned in September 
of 2003, and Dwayne Cooper, the director of finance, ask-
ing all of their consultants to fly to Austin for a meeting on 
June 9, 2003. The Long Center representatives informed 
them that the design on which the consultants had 
worked for three years was being abandoned. The Long 
Center also sought opinions on how to get the project 
quickly back on track. Could the design and construction 
process be expedited? What could be built for a construc-
tion-cost-only budget of $33.5 million, which was what the 
Long Center could afford with the $47 million it already 
had?  
The main hall that the Long Center could afford to build 
for $33.5 million seemed dire. This building program 
became known by the owners’ representative committee 
as Program Zero. The meeting’s minutes described the 
resulting building: “All of the 2,100 seats would be on one 
level, which would make it harder to see the stage from 
the back of the hall. The audience chamber would be sized 
wide and low. This would produce a chamber with a low 
volume ratio that would result in poor acoustics, particu-
larly when the symphony performs.” The space would 
have acoustics comparable to a high school auditorium, 
albeit one of the very best ones. The seats would be made 
of plastic and not metal or wood. The hall would have a 
tiny lobby, if any, and an insufficient number of restrooms 
for all of the patrons. Performance equipment would be 
limited to lights and rigging, and much of the mechanical 
equipment needed by production staff of resident and 
touring companies would have to be stored off-site. 
This program satisfied none of the trustees or founding 
companies. This left the owners’ representative committee 
with two questions:
 1) What are the minimum requirements for a performing 
  arts center that is worth building? 
 2) Is this building program financially feasible?  
  Can the additional money to improve on Program  
  Zero be raised? 
The committee proceeded by debating every issue long 
enough to reach a consensus. At the beginning of the 
committee’s work, Davis and the other members reviewed 
the Three Js’ original vision: to provide an artistic home, 
primarily for the three founding companies. Over time, 
the committee developed three guiding principles to refer 
to as they considered what the new hall should look like: 
fiscal responsibility, universal support, and essential need. 
The members also weighed the possibility of postponing 
each design element until a future, more prosperous time. 
On occasion, emotional attachments to design features 
already promised during the previous process came up 
in the committee or board meetings. These were the mo-
ments when Joe Long’s presence and leadership—and the 
deference he inspired among his peers—were crucial in 
keeping the design on track. If a non-essential feature was 
requested, he would challenge the trustee to find the mon-
ey. “You want that chandelier, you pay for it,” Ruiz remem-
bers Long saying. “I’ll take your check right now.” Since he 
had recently suffered a hip injury, he had in his possession 
a walking cane which he sometimes thumped against 
the floor to emphasize his point. Objections tended to be 
withdrawn quickly.
T
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DRIVERS  OF  COST
he project cost was driven by four decisions that 
the owners’ representative committee needed to 
reconsider: the number of venues within the Cen-
ter, the architectural aesthetics, the quality of acoustics 
in the main hall, and the extent of adaptive reuse. All 
were considered important to project success, and the 
committee’s goal was to find an optimal compromise 
between them that would permit the Center to be built 
within budget.
NUMBER OF  VENU ES
The first decision made by the trustees was which of the 
four venues included in the 2001 SOM design should now 
be retained. Program Zero—the building program that 
could be executed using only the $47 million the Long 
Center already had—allowed for the construction of the 
largest main hall only, significantly lower in quality than de-
sired by the founding companies. All of the other venues 
would require funds beyond the $47 million. However, the 
$47 million included the money from the sale of the nam-
ing rights for three of the four venues. 
Rationales for the venues’ existence varied. The 2,300-seat 
main theater was largely intended for use by the three 
founding companies. The naming rights were given to 
Michael and Susan Dell in exchange for their $10 million 
gift. The founding companies would have priority schedul-
ing, thus limiting the hall’s potential as a rental for lucrative 
performances such as Broadway tours. Between the three 
of them, the Opera, Symphony, and Ballet planned to use 
the hall for 89 performances a year as well as rehears-
als and load-ins. The three classical companies would 
pay some of the highest rental rates in the nation among 
nonprofit artistic groups, most of whom benefit from 
subsidized rents. The Long Center planning documents 
also anticipated 55 days every year when Dell Hall would 
be rented for performances and commercial events by 
outside groups. Additionally, the Long Center planned to 
program its own presented series of performances in the 
main hall, with 38 performance days. Dell Hall was the ven-
ue that would cost the most and, in the trustees’ opinion, 
had the largest claim to existence. Most of the donors who 
had given thus far were the trustees of the three classical 
companies and intended for their money to go towards 
building them a new home.
The 750-seat Topfer Theater was to be named for the 
Topfer family in exchange for their $5 million gift, as well 
as advocacy of the Long Center to the community of 
newly wealthy Dell executives. The Topfer Theater was in-
tended to meet the need for a medium-sized performance 
space in Austin, for both groups that were already looking 
for such a space and for smaller groups that would not 
otherwise have an opportunity to grow in the future. No 
other theaters of Topfer’s size existed in Austin. “That’s a 
reason to do it,” said Davis. “But it’s also a good reason not 
to do it, because there’s usually a good reason there aren’t 
any around. That’s a strange theater size for a proscenium 
theater with a fly tower.” The Topfer would be used by 
Ballet Austin 14 days of the year for its productions of con-
temporary pieces, for which the group expected smaller 
audiences than for its classical fare. Youth theater would 
have a home at the Topfer theater, too. “It was a tar baby,” 
said Ruiz. “If we didn’t know where else to put something, 
we stuck it in there.” The Topfer was a place of possibility, 
a place for artistic growth, where cultural experiences that 
did not yet have a home in Austin could be offered. 
During the 2001 design process, the Topfer was also pro-
jected to produce an operating surplus for the Long Cen-
ter according to the planning documents, which projected 
the theater would be in use 300 days of the year. Ruiz 
questioned this assumption. “I remember one particularly 
snarky call where one of the consultants called and said, ‘I 
hope you know there are 45 groups that are ready to book 
out the entire calendar.’ And I said, ‘Really?’” Ruiz asked 
for the list of prospective bookers, noting that unlike other 
consultants, she was from Austin. Ruiz found that many of 
the groups who promised to rent the Topfer were strug-
gling to draw audiences and pay for space. Some used the 
Ballet Austin building rent-free on the weekends. 
The 225-seat Rollins Theater was meant for smaller com-
munity performing groups, of which Austin had over 200. 
The black box format was conducive to intimate, small-
scale storytelling. Based on conversations with leaders of 
the community groups, Long Center staff and consultants 
estimated this theater would be rented 42 weeks and 
five days out of an average year by 39 external groups. 
This was the community theater that the Long Center 
promised to the city council, and the council expected the 
rental fees for half the events here to be either waived or 
significantly subsidized by the Long Center. Ruiz ques-
tioned whether this theater was financially sustainable. 
“I was keenly interested in the business model behind 
everything. And I clearly understood the cause and effect 
between my rental rates and what else was happening 
there,” she said. She was afraid that the Rollins Theater 
would result in operating deficits that her group would be 
expected to cover with higher rents. “I took a lot of abuse 
for that,” she said. 
T
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The owners’ representative committee discussed the pos-
sibility of finding a partner to build and operate this the-
ater, as well as the option of building it off-site or postpon-
ing its construction to a later phase. Joe Long intervened 
in these discussions early to say that both the promise 
made to the city and the space for community groups 
were crucial, worthwhile objectives. The project cost of 
building the Rollins Theater was $6.4 million. The theater 
built for this money would be the best theater of its size 
in Austin, but far from world-class. The Long Center had 
a naming gift of $5 million for this space from Debra and 
Kevin Rollins, another “Dellionaire” family. 
The rehearsal hall was envisioned as a space that would 
make the Long Center more flexible, permitting more 
simultaneous performances. The hall would also boost the 
operating budget of the Long Center by providing rental 
and catering income from private events. Depending on 
the desired equipment and acoustics, this hall could be 
added to Program Zero for $2-4 million.
ARCHITECTURAL  AESTH ETIC S
Few vocal proponents of architectural aesthetics remained 
on the board. One of Davis’s first acts as the head of the 
owners’ representative committee was to study how much 
architecture costs at a typical performing arts center by 
looking at recently completed projects with the help of the 
DCI cost consultants. “One of the things we discovered 
was that in a typical performing arts facility, ‘architecture’ 
represented 40 percent of the costs of the project,” said 
Davis. “It’s what I’d describe as something without particu-
lar function but principally designed to improve the visual 
appeal of the facility.” 
The need to be budget-conscious eliminated the possibil-
ity of a large architectural statement. However, a Program 
Zero building would be a rectangular box, and several of 
the trustees wanted the new locus for artistic performanc-
es to look more appealing than a warehouse. The ques-
tion of whether the Long Center could afford to spend 
anything at all on aesthetics remained. 
DELL  HALL  ACOU STIC S
Most of the trustees and members of the owners’ repre-
sentative committee thought that superior acoustics were 
essential for the main hall where the Symphony, Opera, 
and Ballet would perform. “We all agreed that for the large 
hall we wanted the best acoustics we could possibly afford 
and we were willing to trade off many things in order to 
realize that,” said Steve Davis. Joe Long said he “insisted 
we have world-class acoustics.” “The place we did not 
skimp on is the place where art is created,” said Ruiz. 
Acoustics for unamplified musical forms like symphony 
and opera are considered black magic by people who 
work in the performing arts. Acoustics are usually de-
signed by highly paid specialized consultants, and even 
these experts are frequently uncertain as to the exact level 
of acoustic excellence the building will achieve until they 
hear the first performance. Despite some unpredictability 
in the final result, many leaders in performing arts swear 
by the benefits of an acoustically superior building, where 
the audience experiences the sound as clear, warm, and 
enveloping, and musicians perform better because they 
can hear one another from opposite ends of the stage. 
One performing arts center director who was a retired 
singer mentioned that in an acoustically perfect hall he felt 
as if it were lifting him up as he sang. Experiences like this 
lead many directors to hope that superior acoustics will 
boost their halls’ competitiveness. 
However, some doubt the value of capital expenses on 
acoustics. David Fleming, the former Long Center CEO, 
had in the past seven years become one of the skeptics. 
“I’ve had battles with acousticians who have argued with 
me that this [the acoustical level] needs to be an 8 and not 
a 7. Millions of dollars ride on this decision, and that’s hog-
wash. It’s not a question to be asked. It’s a question that 
justifies the existence of acousticians. It’s not a question 
that makes a difference in the operations of a performing 
arts center.” 
To some extent, Davis saw Fleming’s point. He thought 
that 90 percent of people probably are incapable of hear-
ing the difference between good and great acoustics. 
He said many audience members will be persuaded by 
what others tell them about the quality of a given theater. 
Nonetheless, professional musicians are likely to fall in the 
10 percent who know the difference and perhaps perform 
better because of it. Thus, Davis was a stalwart supporter 
of acoustical excellence during the committee discussions.
Program Zero provided for a hall with the acoustics of 
a high school auditorium, and many trustees did not 
consider such a space worth building. The acoustician sug-
gested multiple improvements. Going from a noise criteria 
(NC) rating of 30 to 20 would bring the Long Center in 
line with many of its peers in how far distracting noises 
like coughing and candy wrapper crinkling carry within 
the audience chamber. Going further, from an NC 20 rat-
ing to NC 15, would put the Long Center in the 80th to 
85th percentile for noise attenuation in performance halls. 
Concrete shielding for the roof and grout filling for walls 
would protect the audience chamber from external noises 
like thunder and traffic. A shaper orchestra shell, though 
more expensive, would have a significant effect on how 
far sound would carry and how enveloping it would feel 
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to both musicians and audience members during sym-
phony performances. Without a shaper shell, JaffeeHolden 
Acoustics believed that Dell Hall’s potential for acoustical 
quality would be limited to a maximum grade of 8 on a 
scale from 1 to 10. Tiered seating—like parterre, boxes, and 
balconies—would help the space feel more immediate by 
minimizing the distance between stage and farthest row of 
seats. Tiered seating, just like higher quality wooden seats, 
would also provide reflective surfaces for sound, thus al-
lowing it to travel further and to feel warmer to a greater 
portion of the audience. Acoustical banners and moveable 
forestage pieces would enable some acoustical tuning of 
the building between events to improve the sound of each 
individual discipline. All together, these improvements to 
Program Zero would cost $16.7 million.
ADAPTIVE  REUS E  VS .  NEW  CONSTR U C TION
Another major decision for the owners’ representative 
committee was whether to reuse some of the existing 
Palmer Auditorium or to raze this building and start anew. 
DCI said that an adaptive reuse would cost $1.4 million less 
than new construction, but another source estimated that 
the cost of reuse could exceed the cost of new construc-
tion by $2.5 million. This kind of uncertainty about costs is 
endemic to adaptive use projects, since the exact condi-
tion of the existing building is never completely certain. 
Both the schedule and the cost of new construction can 
be more reliably predicted. 
Another argument for complete demolition of the Palmer 
was that the master plan of the site would then have more 
flexibility for future additions of venues and other spaces. 
The backstage spaces would have a more efficient layout 
in a new construction. A deeper stage to accommodate 
larger sets would also be possible. 
On the other hand, the adaptive reuse option also present-
ed several advantages. First, Austin’s environmentally con-
scious population was likely to see “recycling” a building in 
a positive light. Everyone involved with the fundraising ef-
fort agreed. “We had a shot at telling a rejuvenated story,” 
said David Fleming. “The worst thing would be to tell the 
public, ‘We really failed on the first go-around. Everything’s 
trashed, we have to start from scratch.’ We’d rather be 
saying, ‘You know what, we want to be true to our values, 
our core values, from the artistic standpoint. And we have 
to do this on a more economical basis and in keeping 
with a recycling ethic that is valuable to us.’” Second, the 
reuse of the Palmer would result in a larger building, with 
a covered “porch” about 30,000 square feet in size where 
the audience could go on a nice day to enjoy a view of the 
lake and downtown Austin. Additionally, the reused build-
ing would contain another eight thousand square feet in 
reserved, unfinished space that could be easily renovated 
into classrooms or office space later. These additional 
spaces were valued by the owners’ representative commit-
tee at about $1.7 million. Last but not least, working with 
the existing structure could potentially result in a more 
aesthetically pleasing building for the same price if exist-
ing elements were imaginatively used. 
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EPILOGUE
 uilding a new performing arts center requires mak-
ing compromises. Abundance of funds can obviate 
these compromises and require fewer difficult deci-
sions about trade-offs. In the case of the Long Center for 
the Performing Arts, however, financial restriction and the 
necessity of concessions factored in the project’s even-
tual success. They required the board to achieve clarity 
about the new organization’s priorities. The mistakes of 
the first design made the trustees more knowledgeable 
and capable of undertaking the second. Yet, the pro-
tracted, iterative process required absolute doggedness. 
Few of the project’s leaders had anticipated the scope of 
the responsibilities they eventually accepted. Many paid a 
large personal cost—Cliff Redd, for example, attributes his 
recent heart attack to the stress. 
 
By the end of 2003, the Long Center owners’ representa-
tive committee produced a building program that would 
cost $50 million to build and $10 million to design. An ad-
ditional $17 million would be needed for the endowment, 
staff salaries, consultants, and other soft costs. The Long 
Center still had $12 million remaining in cash and $35 mil-
lion in outstanding pledges, most of which would need to 
be re-earned. The board set out to raise an additional $30 
million for a total of $77 million. Donors had to be con-
vinced that the new plan was feasible and right for Austin.
 
Only two venues were included in the final building 
program: Dell Hall and Rollins Theater. The medium-sized 
theater that was supposed to be named after the Topfer 
family was omitted. The Long Center’s relationship with 
these major Austin donors was difficult to rebuild. 
Other features of the building program recommended by 
Davis and the committee included the decision to reuse 
parts of the Palmer; inclusion of many, though not all, of 
the acoustical improvements recommended by Jaffee-
Holden Acoustics; and some enhancements of the lobby 
finishes. Joe Long added $2 million to his gift to pay for 
the latter, for a total gift of $22 million. Skidmore, Owings, 
and Merrill were not rehired. The new design was largely 
completed by Zeidler Partnership Architects and Austin’s 
TeamHaas, which was bought by Nelsen Architects during 
the construction. 
Joe Long hand-picked a new executive director, Cliff Redd, 
to replace David Fleming, who had resigned in 2003 so 
that he could return to his core specialization of running 
existing performing arts centers. Redd proved to be an ef-
fective spokesman during the capital campaign. Together, 
Long and Redd hosted dinners at Long’s home, where 
prospective donors were invited for presentations. Long 
addressed allegations of wastefulness during the first de-
sign campaign by saying that the $12 million spent on the 
first, abandoned design was covered by his and his wife’s 
gift. A native Austinite, Redd was finely attuned to local 
attitudes and chose to stress civic pride and the building’s 
environmentally friendly adaptive reuse during his pitches. 
Overall, $82 million was raised. The $5 million surplus was 
used by Redd for a reserve fund to cover future deficits 
and to renovate some of the unfinished empty space that 
resulted from the Palmer’s reuse, into on-site administra-
tive offices. Otherwise, he and most of his staff would have 
had to commute to the building. 
Many of the project’s leaders are satisfied with the Cen-
ter’s new design. Cookie Ruiz calls it “a monument to what 
the city has created in a post-9/11 world,” noting that the 
lavish SOM plan would have felt out of step with cultural 
changes. Joe Long felt the 2003 crisis and the need to 
start over improved the project. “In retrospect, that [cut-
ting the mid-size theater and the rehearsal hall] was a wise 
thing to have done because I’m not sure the city could 
have supported four venues.” Overall, he is happy with the 
result. “I never go over there that I don’t have three or four 
people that I don’t know tell me how grateful they are that 
we got this done and built the Center. I get people stop-
ping me on Congress Avenue.” 
Yet some parts of the old design are still missed. Ruiz said 
on opening night she dreamt about the sumptuous lobby 
designed by SOM. Others wonder whether some of the 
design elements would have permitted the Long Center 
to be more financially sustainable. Dwayne Cooper wishes 
he had the catering kitchen included in the original plan 
for the rehearsal hall. He thinks its availability would have 
increased the Long Center’s rental income from private 
events. The “porch” the Long Center inherited from Palmer 
Auditorium as the result of the adaptive reuse has the best 
view of the Austin skyline in the city, and Cooper thinks 
the space would be a desirable location to host dinners. 
Davis notes that the committee looked several times at 
models of capital costs and operating revenues for the 
kitchen during planning, but that the projections never 
looked attractive. 
The Long Center opened in March of 2008, just as the 
worst economic recession since the Great Depression was 
beginning. Attendance and revenues for the Long Center, 
as well as for the founding companies, have been lower 
than expected. For its first fiscal year, the Long Center had 
an operating income of $1.6 million, expenses of $3.8 mil-
lion, and gift income of $1.6 million. The Long Center chose 
not to draw on the endowment due to market conditions. 
(The endowment is currently $6 million, with $4 million in 
pledges still outstanding.) Thus, the Long Center finished 
the year with a deficit of $600,000, which was offset 
by rent deposits and sales of tickets for future events in 
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the amount of $700,000. For now, the question of the 
long-term financial sustainability of Austin’s new perform-
ing arts center continues to keep the leaders of the Long 
Center up at night. 
This case was last revised in March 2011.
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